Paper 2026/2888

FALCON-PARE: Full-Range Side-Channel Key Recovery of Falcon via Prior-Enhanced Evidence

Shuyi Chen, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Yuejun Liu, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Jingdian Ming, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Wei Cheng, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Yuhan Zhao, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Yongbin Zhou, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Abstract

Falcon is a compact post-quantum signature scheme selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and its number-theoretic transform (NTT) computations constitute a critical side-channel attack surface. Existing NTT attacks rely on truncated coefficient ranges and do not cover the full valid range of Falcon secret coefficients, limiting their applicability to complete key recovery. This paper proposes FALCON-PARE, a prior-enhanced evidence framework for full-range key recovery of Falcon. FALCON-PARE combines Falcon's discrete-Gaussian prior with aggregated leakage from range conversion and Montgomery multiplication to construct input-layer soft evidence, which is propagated through the NTT factor graph. FALCON-PARE further uses posterior entropy to select reliable coefficients and public-key relation to complete the remaining unknowns, yielding full recovery of the secret polynomials f and g. We systematically evaluate FALCON-PARE on STM32F407 under -O0 and -O3 compiler settings, validating its practicality in terms of profiling-trace requirements, coefficient-wise accuracy, and residual candidate-space reduction. FALCON-PARE achieves single-trace full key recovery with 40 and 120 profiling traces, respectively. At the comparison budgets, FALCON-PARE achieves absolute gains of 54.79% and 73.83% in coefficient-wise accuracy over existing soft-analytical side-channel attacks (SASCA) for NTT leakage, and reduces the residual candidate space from approximately \(2^{4352}\) and \(2^{5346}\) to one, respectively.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ICCD2026
Keywords
Falconside-channel analysisnumber-theoretic transformbelief propagationpost-quantum cryptography
Contact author(s)
chenshuyi @ njust edu cn
liuyuejun @ njust edu cn
mingjingdian @ njust edu cn
wei cheng @ njust edu cn
yhzhao96 @ njust edu cn
zhouyongbin @ njust edu cn
History
2026-11-16: approved
2026-11-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2888
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2888,
      author = {Shuyi Chen and Yuejun Liu and Jingdian Ming and Wei Cheng and Yuhan Zhao and Yongbin Zhou},
      title = {{FALCON}-{PARE}: Full-Range Side-Channel Key Recovery of Falcon via Prior-Enhanced Evidence},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2888},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2888}
}
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