Paper 2026/2877

Toward Efficient Post-Quantum Bitcoin Bridges

Stephen Duan, ZKM, GOAT Network
Vanhger Pham, ZKM
Blake Hou, ZKM
Ethan Zhu, GOAT Network
Jingping Yin, ZKM
Abstract

BitVM-style protocols verify succinct proofs on Bitcoin by garbling a proof verifier off-chain. What reaches the chain in a dispute is the proof itself: its bits under one-time keys, the scripts that authenticate them and the signatures that bind them to transactions. Existing designs garble elliptic-curve SNARK verifiers, which a quantum adversary breaks. Our goal is a post-quantum alternative: a hash-based STARK verifier, garbled and fed with hash-based one-time keys, with no number-theoretic assumption anywhere in the verifier; its price is a far larger proof, and this paper measures and reduces that on-chain data. We compile the complete verifier for WHIR-based STARK proofs from Ziren into a Boolean circuit using free-XOR gadgets for binary-tower arithmetic and Blake3. Our implementation uses Ziren’s binary-field proof stage and narrow recursion. For the final recursive WHIR-proof verifier, our circuit-cost analysis gives 218.0M non-free gates and 564,552 input bits, corresponding to 3.49 GB of garbled tables. The transactions publishing that input with translated Winternitz keys have a total virtual size of 4.26 million virtual bytes (MvB) for one key set.

Note: Source code and measurement artifacts are available at https://github.com/GOATNetwork/bitcoin-stark-verifier.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
post-quantum securitygarbled circuitsSTARKsWHIRzkVMBitcoin bridges
Contact author(s)
stephen d @ zkm io
History
2026-11-14: approved
2026-11-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2877
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2877,
      author = {Stephen Duan and Vanhger Pham and Blake Hou and Ethan Zhu and Jingping Yin},
      title = {Toward Efficient Post-Quantum Bitcoin Bridges},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2877},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2877}
}
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