Paper 2026/2871

The Price of Geometry for Private Distance-Sensitive Filters: $\ell_\infty$ versus $\ell_2$

Paul Cesaretti, CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract

A distance-sensitive set representation stores a set $S$ in a metric space and must accept points within distance $r$ of $S$ and reject points farther than $cr$, each with error probability at most $\alpha$. Under differential privacy, even exact membership costs a privacy loss of $\ln(1/\alpha)$; we ask how much \emph{more} the geometry of the space forces. Earlier lower bounds cover only restricted mechanisms, such as partition-based ones or those whose outputs contain no scattered false positives (``dust''). We prove lower bounds for every mechanism. In $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$ the extra cost is $\Theta_c(d)$, which proves a recent conjecture in this range; when $\lfloor cr\rfloor-r+1$ divides $2r$, a randomly shifted grid is optimal up to $\tilde O(\alpha)$ per dimension. In $\ell_2^d$ the extra cost is instead $\Theta_c(\min(d,\ln(1/\alpha)))$: a new mechanism that outputs a single very large ball shows that dimensions beyond about $\ln(1/\alpha)$ are free, so partition-based constructions are optimal in $\ell_\infty$ but not in $\ell_2$. The same arguments bound the space of every correct representation of $k$-sets, private or not: $\Omega(k(\log(1/\alpha)+d))$ bits in $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$, and $\Omega_c(k(\log(1/\alpha)+\min(d,\log(1/\alpha))))$ bits in every $\ell_p^d$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
differential privacydistance-sensitive filterslower boundsisoperimetryconcentration of measure
Contact author(s)
pcesaretti @ gradcenter cuny edu
History
2026-11-13: approved
2026-11-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2871
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2871,
      author = {Paul Cesaretti},
      title = {The Price of Geometry for Private Distance-Sensitive Filters: $\ell_\infty$ versus $\ell_2$},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2871},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2871}
}
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