Paper 2026/2859
A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the KpqC Digital Signature Scheme AIMer v3
Abstract
The Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition selected AIMer, a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm, as one of its final algorithms in 2025. However, detailed side-channel analysis (SCA) of AIMer remains limited, particularly for its latest version, AIMer v3. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first side-channel attack on AIMer v3. Specifically, we demonstrate a single-trace power analysis attack using deep learning to exploit power leakage from bits of the secret preimage during the computation of AIM3's input affine layer. Using a ChipWhisperer-HuskyPlus, we recover the full secret key from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor with a success rate of 100%. We further evaluate the attack performance under different noise levels and propose potential countermeasures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-channel attacksPost-quantum cryptographyAIMerMPC-in-the-Head
- Contact author(s)
-
jinnuo li @ mail sdu edu cn
wjwang @ sdu edu cn
hao cheng @ sdu edu cn - History
- 2026-11-13: approved
- 2026-11-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2859
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2859,
author = {Jinnuo Li and Yiteng Sun and Chi Cheng and Weijia Wang and Hao Cheng},
title = {A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the {KpqC} Digital Signature Scheme {AIMer} v3},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2859},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2859}
}