Paper 2026/2859

A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the KpqC Digital Signature Scheme AIMer v3

Jinnuo Li, Shandong University
Yiteng Sun, Shandong University
Chi Cheng, Guangzhou University
Weijia Wang, Shandong University
Hao Cheng, Shandong University
Abstract

The Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition selected AIMer, a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm, as one of its final algorithms in 2025. However, detailed side-channel analysis (SCA) of AIMer remains limited, particularly for its latest version, AIMer v3. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first side-channel attack on AIMer v3. Specifically, we demonstrate a single-trace power analysis attack using deep learning to exploit power leakage from bits of the secret preimage during the computation of AIM3's input affine layer. Using a ChipWhisperer-HuskyPlus, we recover the full secret key from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor with a success rate of 100%. We further evaluate the attack performance under different noise levels and propose potential countermeasures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Side-channel attacksPost-quantum cryptographyAIMerMPC-in-the-Head
Contact author(s)
jinnuo li @ mail sdu edu cn
wjwang @ sdu edu cn
hao cheng @ sdu edu cn
History
2026-11-13: approved
2026-11-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2859
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2859,
      author = {Jinnuo Li and Yiteng Sun and Chi Cheng and Weijia Wang and Hao Cheng},
      title = {A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the {KpqC} Digital Signature Scheme {AIMer} v3},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2859},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2859}
}
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