Paper 2026/2852

A Tutorial on Oblivious Random Access Memory

Elaine Shi, Carnegie Mellon University
Srinivas Devadas
Abstract

Abstract—Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a key technique for pro- tecting memory access patterns in systems with untrusted mem- ory, including secure processors, trusted execution environments, and multi-party computation. This article presents a tutorial overview of ORAM concepts and designs from an algorithmic and cryptographic perspective. We review the security goals and threat models underlying ORAM, describe the most popular ORAM constructions and their core mechanisms, and discuss practical considerations for implementing ORAM. The tutorial aims to provide readers with a clear foundation for understanding ORAM-based memory protection and its applications.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE (to appear)
Keywords
Oblivious RAM
Contact author(s)
elaineshi @ cmu edu
devadas @ mit edu
History
2026-11-12: revised
2026-11-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2852
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2852,
      author = {Elaine Shi and Srinivas Devadas},
      title = {A Tutorial on Oblivious Random Access Memory},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2852},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2852}
}
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