Paper 2026/2804

Actively Secure PIR from Verifiable Linear Relations over Rings

Louis Tremblay Thibault, ÉTS Montréal, Mila
Abstract

Privately retrieving data from a database without revealing which element is being retrieved is a fundamental problem in cryptography with many diverse applications. State-of-the-art solutions to this problem are generally based on homomorphic encryption, which offers security only against passive adversaries. In this work, we contribute to the recently introduced notion of Verifiable Private Information Retrieval (vPIR), which leverages verifiable computation to achieve security against active adversaries. We present a new sum-check based interactive oracle proof for linear relations over power-of-two cyclotomic rings, and show how to instantiate it into a vPIR protocol using Ring-LWE. Our solution is concretely efficient, offers the best possible security guarantees and is plausibly post-quantum secure. We additionally provide an open-source Rust implementation. Our server time improves on prior work's IOP by more than an order of magnitude, leading to a factor two end-to-end performance improvement. Compared to vPIR prior work, on a 4 GiB database, our offline communication and client storage are of 128 MiB, against 3.29 GiB. Preprocessing is run once per database and amortized over an unbounded number of queries.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Private information retrievalVerifiable computationLattice-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
louis tremblay-thibault @ mila quebec
History
2026-11-09: approved
2026-11-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2804
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2804,
      author = {Louis Tremblay Thibault},
      title = {Actively Secure {PIR} from Verifiable Linear Relations over Rings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2804},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2804}
}
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