Paper 2026/2798
More Salt, Please: A Simple Compiler for Post-Quantum Strong aPAKE
Abstract
Resistance to precomputation attacks is a central security goal in password-based cryptography, as it drastically increases the runtime of brute-force attacks on breached password hashes. Strong asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (saPAKE), which enforces such precomputation resistance, is standardized by the IRTF and deployed today at large scale. Unfortunately, no practical and easy-to-deploy saPAKE exists yet that withstands quantum attackers. Current constructions use rate-limiting tools such as oblivious pseudo-random functions (OPRFs), of which post-quantum versions are significantly more costly and complex than their discrete-log based counterparts. In this paper, we take a new approach to precomputation resistance. Starting from the compilers from PAKE to aPAKE by Gentry-MacKenzie-Ramzan (Crypto 2006) and Liu-Lyu-Han (Asiacrypt 2024), we propose a password file ratchet that adds precomputation resistance to these compilers through continuously updating the password file. The update is a simple salted hash. With a variety of practical post-quantum PAKEs at hand, this yields a ready-to-deploy post-quantum saPAKE at the trade-off of a changing server state.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Password Authenticated Key ExchangeStrong aPAKEUniversal ComposabilityUCPost-Quantum Protocols
- Contact author(s)
-
william duro @ ibm com
sebastian faller @ ibm com
jhs @ zurich ibm com
mhorvath @ crysys hu - History
- 2026-11-09: approved
- 2026-11-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2798
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2798,
author = {William Riccardo Duro and Sebastian Faller and Julia Hesse and Máté Horváth},
title = {More Salt, Please: A Simple Compiler for Post-Quantum Strong {aPAKE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2798},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2798}
}