Paper 2026/2795
Exploiting Matrix-Vector Multiplication in AIMer: Single-Trace Attacks on Key Generation and Signing
Abstract
This paper presents two side-channel attacks against AIMer v3.0, one of the two signature schemes selected in the Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition. Both are single-trace attacks that recover the full secret key without a profiling phase, one against key generation and one against signing. Both target the same routine: the matrix-vector multiplication invoked by either phase expands each bit of its secret operand into an all-zero or an all-one mask, which then gates the accumulation of the corresponding public matrix row. A single execution therefore leaks one distinguishable segment per secret bit. What makes the attacks non-profiled is that each attacked trace carries its own labelled training set. During key generation, creating the dense invertible public matrices invokes the matrix-vector multiplication routine hundreds of times, on operands that are public. In signing the same derivation takes place, and in addition the signature itself opens all but one of the $N$ parties of every repetition, so the bits of nearly every multiplication in the trace are public. In both attacks we use a supervised classifier to recover the unknown value. In key generation that value is the private key itself, whereas in signing there are three distinct routes to it: the key itself, a party's share of the key, and a party's share of an S-box output. Recovering any one of them is enough to recover the private key. We validate both attacks on an ARM Cortex-M4: one trace recovers the exact secret key from every capture we took, $100$ key generations for each of AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, and $100$ signatures for each of AES-128f, AES-192f and AES-256f. We also discuss possible countermeasures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-channel attacksPost-quantum cryptographyAIMer
- Contact author(s)
-
emir akin @ sabanciuniv edu
talayhan @ bilkent edu tr
ozcan ozturk @ sabanciuniv edu - History
- 2026-11-09: approved
- 2026-11-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2795
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2795,
author = {Süleyman Emir Akın and Abdullah Talayhan and Özcan Öztürk},
title = {Exploiting Matrix-Vector Multiplication in {AIMer}: Single-Trace Attacks on Key Generation and Signing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2795},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2795}
}