Paper 2026/2779

Optimizations and First-Order Masking of AIMer on Cortex-M4

DongCheon Kim, Kookmin University
Jaeseung Han, Kookmin University
Dong-Guk Han, Kookmin University
Seog Chung Seo, Kookmin University
Abstract

We optimize AIMer-128f on Cortex-M4 and propose first-order masking of its signing. Since squaring is a Frobenius map about $\times 16$ cheaper than multiplication, we restructure AIM2's inverse-Mersenne S-box into a Frobenius-shifted addition chain, cutting multiplications per S-box from 24/23 to 9/10. Since one multiplication-check operand is constant across $N = 16$ parties, we build the partial-product table once and reuse it. Both are orthogonal to single-multiplication acceleration, and with a Radix-16 multiplier on NUCLEO-L4R5ZI, keygen/sign/verify drop 18.55%/3.94%/7.30%. 1-PINI gadgets on every sensitive operation give first-order probing security. TVLA finds no first-order leakage in 100,000 traces. Masking costs $\times 10.5$, itself improved 5.20%.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
AIMerOptimizationMaskingCortex-M4Binary field arithmetic
Contact author(s)
kindongsy @ kookmin ac kr
jae1115 @ kookmin ac kr
christa @ kookmin ac kr
scseo @ kookmin ac kr
History
2026-11-08: approved
2026-11-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2779
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2779,
      author = {DongCheon Kim and Jaeseung Han and Dong-Guk Han and Seog Chung Seo},
      title = {Optimizations and First-Order Masking of {AIMer} on Cortex-M4},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2779},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2779}
}
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