Paper 2026/2615

Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures

Chad Sharp, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
Paul Grubbs, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
Abstract

We present GordieHowe, a system comprising a language, a certifying compiler, and a zero-knowledge proof protocol. GordieHowe is especially suitable for building anonymous credentials on top of standardized signature schemes like ECDSA, RSA, and ML-DSA. GordieHowe is the first system to achieve the following three properties simultaneously: provable security against quantum attackers, efficiency for statements spanning multiple fields—including proving and verifying in parallel—and automatic batching of structured computations. GordieHowe is high-assurance by design. The language is designed to enable static checking of bounds safety, preventing integer overflows. Its compiler emits a Lean certificate that its optimization decisions are semantics-preserving for the input program. The proof system's security theorems are machine-checked in Lean. GordieHowe is faster and has smaller proofs than comparable prior work. It proves, in parallel on four cores, an ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation in 64.8 ms with a 276 KiB proof, 10.1× faster and 22% smaller than Google's Longfellow. With at least 101 bits of knowledge soundness in the random oracle model, GordieHowe proves knowledge of a 1 KiB SHA3-256 preimage in 5.0 ms with a 60 KiB proof, and of an RSA-2048 signature on a private 2 KiB message in 25.9 ms with a 210 KiB proof. With at least 116 bits against quantum adversaries, GordieHowe proves knowledge of an ML-DSA-44 signature on a private message in 87.3 ms with a 549 KiB proof, 70.2× faster and 29% smaller than an optimized Longfellow circuit. In building GordieHowe we make a number of contributions of independent interest. We define a new notion of an interactive oracle proof (IOP) whose messages are partially ordered, which we call a series-parallel IOP. We extend the BCS transformation to series-parallel IOPs, and give knowledge soundness and ZK proofs in the QROM. We also show our BCS extension satisfies a form of simulation extractability in the QROM; we believe this is the first simulation extractability result of any kind for BCS in the QROM.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
zero-knowledgesignaturesanonymous credentialsml-dsaecdsarsaqrom
Contact author(s)
cmlsharp @ umich edu
paulgrub @ umich edu
History
2026-10-24: approved
2026-10-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2615
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2615,
      author = {Chad Sharp and Paul Grubbs},
      title = {Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2615},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2615}
}
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