Paper 2026/2523

GKS FHE: Security Analysis

John Graham, Zero Inc.
Delaram Kahrobaei, Queens College, CUNY
Soundes Marzougui, Qubit Guard
Milos Pavlovic, Zero Inc.
Vladimir Shpilrain, City University of New York
Abstract

All traditional encryption schemes share a fundamental operational vulnerability: encrypted data must be decrypted before it can be used. Fully homomorphic encryption eliminates this vulnerability by enabling computation directly on encrypted data, but existing FHE schemes impose substantial practical constraints that limit deployment. This paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key FHE scheme. GKS requires no bootstrapping or de-linearization, produces bit-exact decryption, supports native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
fully homomorphic encryptionprivate-key FHEAI trainingmachine learningprivate search
Contact author(s)
jgraham @ zerofhe ai
Delaram Kahrobaei @ qc cuny edu
marzougui soundes @ gmail com
milos @ zerofhe ai
vshpilrain @ ccny cuny edu
History
2026-10-19: approved
2026-10-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2523
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2523,
      author = {John Graham and Delaram Kahrobaei and Soundes Marzougui and Milos Pavlovic and Vladimir Shpilrain},
      title = {{GKS} {FHE}: Security Analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2523},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2523}
}
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