Paper 2026/2404

The Geometry of Collusion Leakage in Inner-Product Functional Encryption

Ferdinando Zullo, University of Campania "Luigi Vanvitelli"
Abstract

Inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) allows the holder of a functional key for a vector $y$ to learn $\langle x,y\rangle$ from an encryption of $x$, and nothing more. Keys, however, accumulate: a coalition holding sufficiently many independent keys recovers the plaintext. We model each institution by the span $W_i\leq\F_q^n$ of its authorized key vectors and show that a coalition $I$ determines the plaintext exactly modulo $(\sum_{i\in I}W_i)^\perp$; for a uniform plaintext it learns exactly $\dim\sum_{i\in I}W_i$ field symbols. The resulting leakage function is a representable and entropic polymatroid. We then study authorization spaces of dimension $r$ whose pairwise intersections have dimension at most $h$. We prove that some coalition of size $c\geq2$ always learns at least $\min\{n,2r-h+c-2\}$ dimensions, and we give a Vandermonde-type construction in which every coalition of size $c$ learns exactly this amount, for all $c$ simultaneously. Hence the largest achievable reconstruction threshold is $n-2r+h+2$, which gives an exact tradeoff between functional diversity and collusion resistance. The optimal configuration is a sunflower, an equidistant subspace code and a generalized arc; its orthogonal complements form a generalized dual arc, and for $r=1$ it reduces to Reed--Solomon secret sharing.

Note: Any comment is welcome!

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Functional encryptioncoalitionsfinite geometry
Contact author(s)
ferdinando zullo @ unicampania it
History
2026-10-08: approved
2026-10-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2404
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2404,
      author = {Ferdinando Zullo},
      title = {The Geometry of Collusion Leakage in Inner-Product Functional Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2404},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2404}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.