Paper 2026/2384

A Security-Aware PQC Benchmarking Framework on Dual-Core Xtensa Silicon

Abstract

Deploying memory-heavy post-quantum cryptography (PQC) at the smart grid edge threatens real-time substation determinism, directly conflicting with the strict $\le 3 ms$ GOOSE tripping window of the IEC 61850 standard. To resolve this architectural tension, we propose a security-aware, hardware-in-the-loop benchmarking framework on the dual-core Xtensa LX7 (ESP32-S3) SoC running FreeRTOS. To prevent inter-core resource contention, the framework employs an asymmetric task-isolation design, pinning cryptographic operations to Core 1 while leaving Core 0 responsive to line-rate grid interrupts. Additionally, we define a programmatic heap-auditing methodology to model how heap_4.c maps key-state allocations across physical DRAM fragments while preserving the primary 128 KB contiguous system heap. Finally, we formulate an analytical latency model of the external Octal-SPI PSRAM interface, mathematically characterizing the CPU stall overhead ($C_{\text{stall}}$) induced when side-channel masking forces secret polynomial shares to spill over the external bus during non-sequential Cooley-Tukey NTT strides. This framework provides a rigorous methodology to characterize micro-architectural trade-offs, enabling utility engineers to plan post-quantum migration pathways without violating real-time grid constraints.