Paper 2026/2333
The Power of Permutable PRPs: Towards Trapdoor Permutations with Full Key and Message Domains
Abstract
Shmueli and Zhandry introduced permutable pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and used them to construct trapdoor permutations with a full message domain but a sparse public-key space. We extend this approach to construct puncturable trapdoor permutations with full message and per-instance key domains in the common-reference-string (CRS) model. Our construction assumes a secure permutable PRP for general swaps, indistinguishability obfuscation, and an injective length-doubling pseudorandom generator, all secure against polynomial-time adversaries. Instantiating the underlying permutable PRP from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions requires subexponential security. A one-time setup produces a CRS and a master trapdoor. For every honestly generated CRS, every bit string of the prescribed key length indexes a permutation of the full message space, allowing uniform public-key sampling without validation or rejection. The master trapdoor derives an inversion trapdoor for every key. The family supports two-level puncturing: the master trapdoor can be punctured at a key, and an individual trapdoor can be punctured at an output. For a uniformly sampled challenge key and output, recovering the missing preimage remains hard even when both punctured trapdoors are revealed. To our knowledge, this is the first family combining these full-domain properties, master trapdoor derivation, and two-level punctured security. We give three applications. In the random-oracle model, the family yields deterministic identity-based encryption with zero ciphertext expansion and adaptive weak-source pseudorandomness under a computational hardness condition on message sources. Security holds even given a key that decrypts every ciphertext except the challenge under the selected identity. The family also yields identity-based signatures with perfect uniqueness and adaptive unforgeability in the random-oracle model. Finally, puncturable trapdoors give a direct construction of hard-on-average End-of-Line instances, establishing PPAD hardness without passing through Sink-of-Verifiable-Line.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- trapdoor permutationspuncturable permutationsfull key domainsindistinguishability obfuscation
- Contact author(s)
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shany ben-david @ biu ac il
eylon yogev @ biu ac il - History
- 2026-10-05: approved
- 2026-10-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2333
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2333,
author = {Shany Ben-David and Eylon Yogev},
title = {The Power of Permutable {PRPs}: Towards Trapdoor Permutations with Full Key and Message Domains},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2333},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2333}
}