Paper 2026/2331

Enhancing One-Way to Hiding Theorems with Amplitude Amplification

Bohang Chen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shuai Han, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Geng Wang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Xinyi Huang, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Abstract

The one-way to hiding (O2H) theorem and its variants, which bound the distinguishing advantage in terms of the one-way advantage, are widely used in security proofs in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), particularly for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). However, existing O2H bounds typically incur a security loss depending on the adversary's oracle query depth $d$ (i.e. the number of sequential layers of parallel queries), which can make both computational and information-theoretic bounds in KEM security proofs less tight. In this work, we establish a generic amplitude-amplification-based technique to many O2H variants to remove their depth-dependent factors by these theorems in the advantage bounds.This covers the Semi-Classical O2H (SC-O2H) [Ambainis et al., CRYPTO 2019] and Measure-Rewind-Extract O2H (MRE-O2H) [Ge et al., ASIACRYPT 2024] theorems, in which the constructed one-way adversaries have access to an indicator oracle $\mathbf{1}_S$ that checks whether the input is a valid solution to the one-way game. We identify conditions under which our enhanced O2H theorems can replace the original O2H theorems in existing security proofs. These conditions hold for a range of security proofs, including IND-CCA security proofs for KEMs obtained from variants of the U transformation in the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) framework. Applying our enhanced theorems in these proofs yields the following improvements in the depth dependence of security bounds: - When the one-way advantage is bounded information-theoretically, our technique eliminates the depth-dependent factors with only a constant-factor loss in the security bound. - When the one-way advantage is bounded by computational hardness assumptions, our technique eliminates the depth-dependent factors $d$ for SC-O2H and $\sqrt{d}$ for MRE-O2H, at the cost of increasing the constructed one-way adversary's running time by a factor that is only of the order of the square roots of the eliminated losses, namely $O(\sqrt{d})$ for SC-O2H and $O(\sqrt[4]{d})$ for MRE-O2H.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-quantum securityKEMQROMO2H
Contact author(s)
bohang0918 @ sjtu edu cn
dalen17 @ sjtu edu cn
wanggxx @ sjtu edu cn
huangxinyi @ nuaa edu cn
History
2026-10-05: approved
2026-10-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2331
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2331,
      author = {Bohang Chen and Shuai Han and Geng Wang and Xinyi Huang},
      title = {Enhancing One-Way to Hiding Theorems with Amplitude Amplification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2331},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2331}
}
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