Paper 2026/2331
Enhancing One-Way to Hiding Theorems with Amplitude Amplification
Abstract
The one-way to hiding (O2H) theorem and its variants, which bound the distinguishing advantage in terms of the one-way advantage, are widely used in security proofs in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), particularly for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). However, existing O2H bounds typically incur a security loss depending on the adversary's oracle query depth $d$ (i.e. the number of sequential layers of parallel queries), which can make both computational and information-theoretic bounds in KEM security proofs less tight. In this work, we establish a generic amplitude-amplification-based technique to many O2H variants to remove their depth-dependent factors by these theorems in the advantage bounds.This covers the Semi-Classical O2H (SC-O2H) [Ambainis et al., CRYPTO 2019] and Measure-Rewind-Extract O2H (MRE-O2H) [Ge et al., ASIACRYPT 2024] theorems, in which the constructed one-way adversaries have access to an indicator oracle $\mathbf{1}_S$ that checks whether the input is a valid solution to the one-way game. We identify conditions under which our enhanced O2H theorems can replace the original O2H theorems in existing security proofs. These conditions hold for a range of security proofs, including IND-CCA security proofs for KEMs obtained from variants of the U transformation in the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) framework. Applying our enhanced theorems in these proofs yields the following improvements in the depth dependence of security bounds: - When the one-way advantage is bounded information-theoretically, our technique eliminates the depth-dependent factors with only a constant-factor loss in the security bound. - When the one-way advantage is bounded by computational hardness assumptions, our technique eliminates the depth-dependent factors $d$ for SC-O2H and $\sqrt{d}$ for MRE-O2H, at the cost of increasing the constructed one-way adversary's running time by a factor that is only of the order of the square roots of the eliminated losses, namely $O(\sqrt{d})$ for SC-O2H and $O(\sqrt[4]{d})$ for MRE-O2H.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum securityKEMQROMO2H
- Contact author(s)
-
bohang0918 @ sjtu edu cn
dalen17 @ sjtu edu cn
wanggxx @ sjtu edu cn
huangxinyi @ nuaa edu cn - History
- 2026-10-05: approved
- 2026-10-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2331
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2331,
author = {Bohang Chen and Shuai Han and Geng Wang and Xinyi Huang},
title = {Enhancing One-Way to Hiding Theorems with Amplitude Amplification},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2331},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2331}
}