Paper 2026/2309

Three-Move Blind Signatures from DL

Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom, University of Washington
Michael Reichle, INSAIT, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”
Stefano Tessaro, University of Washington
Abstract

This paper considers the problem of building blind signatures in pairing-free groups. We provide the first three-move blind signature which is provably one-more unforgeable, in the random-oracle model, under the minimal assumption that the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is hard. Our construction in fact achieves one-more strong unforgeability, and also supports partial blindness. Blindness is statistical, also in the ROM. Our construction makes black-box use of the underlying group and does not rely on non-black-box techniques. For most such constructions, three moves are necessary by a recent result of Dietz, Kastner, and Tessaro (CRYPTO '26). We build on recent work by Chairattana-Apirom, Reichle, and Tessaro (CRYPTO '26), which achieved the same combination of round complexity and security guarantees, but under the stronger decisional Diffie--Hellman (DDH) assumption. In particular, we follow the same paradigm of boosting the security of a weakly secure scheme (namely, the Okamoto--Schnorr blind signature) to a fully secure one by authenticating the initial nonce. We provide, however, a substantially different instantiation of this paradigm that dispenses with the use of DDH and establishes security from DL alone.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Blind SignaturesGroupsProgrammable Hash Functions
Contact author(s)
rchairat @ cs washington edu
michael reichle @ insait ai
tessaro @ cs washington edu
History
2026-10-04: approved
2026-10-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2309
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2309,
      author = {Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom and Michael Reichle and Stefano Tessaro},
      title = {Three-Move Blind Signatures from {DL}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2309},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2309}
}
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