Paper 2026/2270
UC PAKE and Concrete Security
Abstract
The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides a paradigm for security definitions that allows for arbitrary composition, but has been criticized for being unamicable to the concrete security approach, as the meaning of a concrete UC-security statement is hard to interpret in practice. This work aims at alleviating this concern in the context of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE): we show that any concrete UC-security statement for PAKE can be easily converted to a concrete game-based security statement, whose real-life meaning is clearer. We also briefly discuss potential generalizations of our result to other cryptographic primitives.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- universal composabilityPAKE
- Contact author(s)
-
fengti @ oregonstate edu
xujiay @ oregonstate edu - History
- 2026-09-30: approved
- 2026-09-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2270
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2270,
author = {Tingfei Feng and Jiayu Xu},
title = {{UC} {PAKE} and Concrete Security},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2270},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270}
}
