Paper 2026/223

Nested MuSig2

Nadav Kohen, Chaincode Labs
Abstract

Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 327 specifies a variant of the MuSig2 multi-signature protocol that is becoming widely adopted in Bitcoin applications. This protocol enables multiple participants to collaboratively compute (BIP 340) Schnorr signatures for a single aggregate public key efficiently, while preventing external parties from distinguishing whether multiple signers were involved. It has been widely proposed that it should be secure to allow MuSig2 participant keys to themselves be "nested" MuSig2-aggregated keys. No security argument has previously been presented for this practice, though various applications have been proposed that assume the security of such an operation. In this work, we propose NestedMuSig2, a recursive variant of MuSig2 that enables a tree of nested cosigners to privately generate aggregate Schnorr signatures while maintaining all of the efficiency and security benefits of MuSig2, including non-interactive public key aggregation. Nested signers in this scheme cannot distinguish between cosigners that are using further nesting and those that are not. In particular, this means that NestedMuSig2 is compatible with all existing protocols that use MuSig2. We reduce the security of NestedMuSig2 to the AOMDL assumption in the random oracle model. Similarly, we reduce the security of a more efficient and compact variant to the AOMDL assumption in the random oracle model used in conjunction with the algebraic group model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
multi-signaturesnested multi-signaturesSchnorr signatureskey aggregationBitcoin
Contact author(s)
nadav @ chaincode com
History
2026-02-12: approved
2026-02-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/223
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/223,
      author = {Nadav Kohen},
      title = {Nested {MuSig2}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/223},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/223}
}
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