Paper 2026/2142

$\mathsf{PRAWNS}$: Threshold Hash-Based Signatures from Threshold PRFs

Dan Boneh, Stanford University
Benedikt Bünz, New York University
Justin D., Localhost
Yavor Litchev, Stanford University
Kamilla Nazirkhanova, Stanford University
Abstract

We propose an efficient threshold mechanism that is well suited for certain hash-based signatures. Our proposal has a number of compelling features: • The final signature assembled from a quorum of signature shares has the same format as a non-threshold hash-based signature. In particular, the verifier is unaware that the signer is thresholdized. Moreover, we can add and remove parties and change the threshold without changing the public key. • Our framework can be used to thresholdize one-time signature schemes, such as Winternitz, and a few-time schemes, such as XMSS, HORS, FORS, and PORS+FP. • The public key and the signatures reveal nothing about the number of parties $n$ or the threshold $t$. • An instantiation of our framework scales well to a large number of parties $n$ and a large threshold $t$. One limitation of the framework is that it does not support an efficient distributed key generation protocol (DKG). Another limitation is that the framework does not directly apply to SLH-DSA. It is primarily designed for the Winternitz, XMSS, and FORS schemes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
post-quantum cryptographythreshold signatureshash-based signaturesthreshold pseudorandom functions
Contact author(s)
dabo @ cs stanford edu
bbuenz @ gmail com
justin @ lclhost org
ylitchev @ stanford edu
nazirk @ stanford edu
History
2026-09-22: approved
2026-09-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2142
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2142,
      author = {Dan Boneh and Benedikt Bünz and Justin D. and Yavor Litchev and Kamilla Nazirkhanova},
      title = {$\mathsf{{PRAWNS}}$: Threshold Hash-Based Signatures from Threshold {PRFs}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2142},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2142}
}
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