Paper 2026/2018
On the (Im)possibility of Asynchronous Proactive Secret Sharing
Abstract
In this paper, we systematically study the (im)possibilities of proactive secret sharing (PSS) in fully asynchronous authenticated networks. To reflect the subtleties arising from the absence of a global clock, we first formalize a hierarchy of natural mobile adversary models for asynchronous PSS (APSS), capturing different adversarial capabilities over corrupted parties and distinct ways of accounting for mobile corruption in asynchrony. Under these models, we then (i) establish new impossibility results by exhibiting generic attacks on APSS, thereby deriving the corresponding resilience upper bounds, and (ii) demonstrate the tightness of these bounds via explicit APSS protocols achieving optimal resilience in each model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2026
- Keywords
- Proactive secret sharingMobile adversaryAsynchronous network
- Contact author(s)
-
ericablum @ reed edu
gaoyingzi @ sdu edu cn
julian loss @ rub de
lu_yuan @ a-star edu sg
zhenliang lu @ cityu edu hk
qiang tang @ sydney edu au - History
- 2026-09-14: approved
- 2026-09-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2018
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2018,
author = {Erica Blum and Yingzi Gao and Julian Loss and Yuan Lu and Zhenliang Lu and Qiang Tang},
title = {On the (Im)possibility of Asynchronous Proactive Secret Sharing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2018},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2018}
}
