Paper 2026/1920

Compact Lattice Anonymous Credentials from Tighter Approximate Range Proofs

Corentin Jeudy, Orange (France)
Olivier Sanders, Orange (France)
Abstract

Accommodating cryptographic authenticity with strong user privacy assurances has been the primary motivation for anonymous credentials systems. Their features have recently come into the spotlight with the European Digital Identity (EUDI) wallet initiative, insisting on the need for efficient and private solutions based on well-understood security foundations for high assurances. This coincides with the post-quantum transition, but current quantum-safe solutions based on standard assumptions are still lagging behind the ones on ad-hoc interactive assumptions performance-wise. In this paper, we present several techniques to improve the efficiency of anonymous credentials from standard lattice assumptions, narrowing the gap with more efficient but also more exotic ones. Alongside other optimizations, our main improvement stems from tighter approximate range proofs in the zero-knowledge protocol of Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, Plançon (Crypto'22), currently the efficiency bottleneck of lattice privacy-oriented constructions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Lattice-Based CryptographyAnonymous CredentialsPrivacyZero-Knowledge Proof
Contact author(s)
corentin jeudy @ orange com
olivier sanders @ orange com
History
2026-09-10: approved
2026-09-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1920
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1920,
      author = {Corentin Jeudy and Olivier Sanders},
      title = {Compact Lattice Anonymous Credentials from Tighter Approximate Range Proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1920},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1920}
}
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