Paper 2026/190

Three-Round (Robust) Threshold ECDSA from Threshold CL Encryption

Bowen Jiang, Singapore Management University
Guofeng Tang, Singapore Management University
Haiyang Xue, Singapore Management University
Abstract

Threshold ECDSA has become a crucial security component in blockchain and decentralized systems, as it mitigates the risk of a single point of failure. Following the multiplicative-to-additive approach, the state-of-the-art threshold ECDSA (Doerner et al. in S&P24) requires only three rounds but has \( O(n) \) outgoing communication complexity. Based on threshold CL encryption, Wong et al. (in NDSS24) proposed the first scheme with constant outgoing communication; however, their scheme requires at least four rounds. We bridge this gap by introducing a three-round threshold ECDSA scheme with constant outgoing communication based on threshold CL encryption. Additionally, we enhance our basic scheme with robustness while maintaining the number of communication rounds, albeit at the cost of non-constant outgoing communication. Our implementation demonstrates that the basic scheme achieves optimal runtime and communication costs, while the robust variant reduces the communication rounds required by Wong et al.'s scheme, incurring only a small additional cost in small-scale settings.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. In Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy 2025
DOI
10.1007/978-981-96-9095-4_12
Keywords
Threshold ECDSAThree-Round CommunicationThreshold CL encryptionRobustness
Contact author(s)
bowen jiang 2024 @ phdcs smu edu sg
tang guofeng789 @ gmail com
haiyangxc @ gmail com
History
2026-02-06: approved
2026-02-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/190
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/190,
      author = {Bowen Jiang and Guofeng Tang and Haiyang Xue},
      title = {Three-Round (Robust) Threshold {ECDSA} from Threshold {CL} Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/190},
      year = {2026},
      doi = {10.1007/978-981-96-9095-4_12},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/190}
}
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