Paper 2026/1874

Collusion-Resistant Constrained PRFs for Compute-&-Compare Predicates from LWE

Jiaqi Cheng, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Rishab Goyal, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Abstract

We design the first collusion-resistant constrained PRFs (CPRFs) for a non-trivial and expressive class of constraints from standard LWE. The two predicate classes for which we design CPRFs are: compute-&-compare and predicated range constraints. We improve our CPRF for compute-&-compare predicates to also satisfy collusion-resistant constraint privacy. An additional feature of our CPRFs is that they also satisfy (almost-)key-homomorphic property. Prior to this work, we did not have any post-quantum collusion-resistant CPRF beyond prefixfixing constraints, and collusion-resistant CPRFs for expressive predicates relied on either code obfuscation or multilinear maps. As an immediate application, we obtain a two-sided predicate encryption (PE) and functional encryption (FE) for the compute-&-compare class in the symmetric-key setting. Prior to this work, we did not have any post-quantum construction for 2-sided PE/FE beyond inner product predicates. An important contribution of this work is to introduce a new framework of purifying functionality. The main motivation behind our new framework is to systematically eliminate zeroizing attacks, which have been a highly successful cryptanalysis paradigm for breaking various candidates for advanced cryptographic objects.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2026
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-35367-2_17
Keywords
Constrained PRFs
Contact author(s)
jiaqicheng @ cs wisc edu
rishab @ cs wisc edu
History
2026-09-06: approved
2026-09-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1874
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1874,
      author = {Jiaqi Cheng and Rishab Goyal},
      title = {Collusion-Resistant Constrained {PRFs} for Compute-&-Compare Predicates from {LWE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1874},
      year = {2026},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-032-35367-2_17},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1874}
}
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