Paper 2026/1507
Analyzing Cryptography in Context: A Cryptography-Native Approach to Threat Modeling
, Boston University, Boston University, University of Maryland, College ParkAbstract
We observe that the existing norms within cryptography do not expect protocol analysts to document the sociotechnical properties that a deployed system should have. To help close this potential gap, we develop a framework that allows bringing sociotechnical dimensions into analyses of cryptographic systems, and in particular facilitates "in-context" analysis of proposed cryptographic deployments on top of widely-accepted cryptographic modeling techniques. To explore the utility of our framework, we use Apple's 2021 CSAM scanning proposal as a case study. We show how our framework naturally surfaces many of the criticisms of Apple's proposal and helps us identify a previously undocumented property of the proposal.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX Security 2026
- Keywords
- Threat Modeling
- Contact author(s)
-
canetti @ bu edu
hajulie @ bu edu
kaptchuk @ umd edu - History
- 2026-07-25: approved
- 2026-07-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1507
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1507,
author = {Ran Canetti and Julie Ha and Gabriel Kaptchuk},
title = {Analyzing Cryptography in Context: A Cryptography-Native Approach to Threat Modeling},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1507},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1507}
}
