Paper 2026/1408

Statistically Undetectable Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks

Andrej Bogdanov, University of Ottawa
Alon Rosen, Bocconi University
Neekon Vafa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract

We show how an adversarial model trainer can plant backdoors in a large class of deep, feedforward neural networks. These backdoors are statistically undetectable in the white-box setting, meaning that the backdoored and honestly trained models are close in total variation distance, even given the full descriptions of the models (e.g., all of the weights). The backdoor provides access to invariance-based adversarial examples for every input, mapping distant inputs to unusually close outputs. However, without the backdoor, it is provably impossible (under LWE) to generate any such adversarial examples in polynomial time. Our theoretical and preliminary empirical findings demonstrate a fundamental power asymmetry between model trainers and model users.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ICML 2026
Keywords
backdoorneural networkmachine learningadversarial exampleprovenance
Contact author(s)
abogdano @ uottawa ca
alon rosen @ unibocconi it
nvafa @ mit edu
History
2026-07-15: approved
2026-07-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1408
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1408,
      author = {Andrej Bogdanov and Alon Rosen and Neekon Vafa},
      title = {Statistically Undetectable Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1408},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1408}
}
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