Paper 2026/1384

Lower Bounds for PIR with Preprocessing from Blackbox Cryptography

Alexander Hoover, Stevens Institute of Technology
Giuseppe Persiano, University of Salerno
Kevin Yeo, Google (United States)
Abstract

We study the limits of single-server private information retrieval (PIR) with preprocessing. Prior work has shown that single-server PIR with sublinear communication requires a linear number of (public-key) server operations per query [DMO00, DH24]. Recent breakthrough works, including [CHK22, ZPZS24, LMW23], circumvent these lower bounds by critically leveraging preprocessing to construct single-server PIR with sublinear query computation. Our work presents computation lower bounds for any single-server PIR with preprocessing that makes blackbox usage of any cryptography (such as random oracles and virtual blackbox obfuscation). For any client preprocessing scheme where the client stores $s$ bits about an $n$-bit database, we prove the online amortized computation must be $\Omega(n/s)$ across $k = \Omega(s)$ queries (even if performed in a single batch query). In more detail, we prove that they must have either $\Omega(n/s)$ amortized online communication or the server must perform $\Omega(n/s)$ cryptographic operations. Our lower bounds are optimal as there exist PIRs with client preprocessing matching exactly one of the above requirements while outperforming the other. Furthermore, our lower bounds also rule out the existence of doubly efficient PIR from blackbox cryptography with sublinear query computation (current constructions use ring LWE). We note our lower bounds are widely applicable to any single-server PIR scheme that makes blackbox usage of cryptography including those with weaker privacy guarantees. In contrast, prior works only proved computation lower bounds for restricted classes of single-server PIR constructions (e.g., non-encoding servers or single-roundtrip queries). Our proof framework also supports $\Omega(n/s)$ communication lower bounds for the following three classes of single-server PIR: schemes where the server performs $o(n/s)$ cryptographic operations, schemes where the server's cryptographic operations depend only on query communication and schemes with perfect privacy in the idealized model. Our results hold unconditionally whereas prior communication lower bounds required additional complexity assumptions. We also prove lower bounds for symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) with client preprocessing in the random oracle model and present a matching SPIR construction with client preprocessing using only OWFs during queries.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. FOCS 2026
Keywords
lower boundsprivate information retrievalpirpreprocessingblackbox separation
Contact author(s)
ahoover @ stevens edu
giuper @ gmail com
kwlyeo @ google com
History
2026-07-07: approved
2026-07-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1384
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1384,
      author = {Alexander Hoover and Giuseppe Persiano and Kevin Yeo},
      title = {Lower Bounds for {PIR} with Preprocessing from Blackbox Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1384},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1384}
}
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