Paper 2026/136

Private Proofs of When and Where

Uma Girish, Columbia University
Grzegorz Gluch, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of California, Berkeley
Shafi Goldwasser, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of California, Berkeley
Tal Malkin, Columbia University
Leo Orshansky, Columbia University
Henry Yuen, Columbia University
Abstract

Position verification schemes are interactive protocols where entities prove their physical location to others; this enables interactive proofs for statements of the form "I am at a location L." Although secure position verification cannot be achieved with classical protocols (even with computational assumptions), they are feasible with quantum protocols. In this paper we introduce the notion of zero-knowledge position verification, which generalizes position verification in two ways: 1. enabling entities to prove more sophisticated statements about their locations at different times (for example, "I was NOT near location L at noon yesterday"). 2. maintaining privacy for any other detail about their true location besides the statement they are proving. We construct zero-knowledge position verification from standard position verification and post-quantum one-way functions. The central tool in our construction is a primitive we call position commitments, which allow entities to privately commit to their physical position in a particular moment, which is then revealed at some later time.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
position verificationquantum cryptographyzero knowledgeprivacy
Contact author(s)
lo2433 @ columbia edu
History
2026-02-13: last of 2 revisions
2026-01-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/136
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/136,
      author = {Uma Girish and Grzegorz Gluch and Shafi Goldwasser and Tal Malkin and Leo Orshansky and Henry Yuen},
      title = {Private Proofs of When and Where},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/136},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/136}
}
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