Paper 2026/1160

Generic Committing Attacks: Zero-Padded Ascon is Less Secure than Expected

Abstract

We study generic committing attacks—where ciphertexts decrypt under more than one context, i.e., key, nonce, associated data—for sponge-based authenticated encryption. As our main contribution, we give three new committing attacks which outperform existing attacks. One of our attacks provides a counterexample showing that the previous proof for the committing security of Ascon-like schemes with zero-padding does not extend to all parameter choices: in case of 128-bit tags and 256-bit zero-padding, the existing analysis claims 192-bit security; our attack reduces this by 62 bits down to 130-bit. Our attacks are applicable to the standardized scheme Ascon. As a further contribution, we analyze existing attack strategies for a generic sponge construction with various design features such as key-blinding, zero-padding, and state-update-functions.