Paper 2026/1151

Fine-Grained Residual Interval Screening Enhanced Least Square for the Secret Key Recovery of Dilithium

Kailong Shi, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS
Hailong Zhang, North China Electric Power University
Dongdai Lin, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS
Zichen Wang, George Washington University
Abstract

In practice, the amount of side channel leakage related to the random polynomial generation of Dilithium can be limited. In this case, the coe cients of the random polynomial may not be recovered accurately, which then makes the secret key recovery with least square a difficult problem. Therefore, how to recover the secret key used by Dilithium with noisy equations becomes a meaningful concern. In light of this, the ne-grained residual interval screening is proposed to enhance the ability of least square to recover the secret key used by Dilithium. The core idea is to estimate the distributions of the residuals related to both correct and erroneous equations computed with the least square recovered candidate secret key in a pro ling scenario. Then, according to the distribution di erence of the residuals related to two types of equations, an interval can be screened. Note that a majority of erroneous equations are out of the screened interval while a majority of correct equations are in the screened interval. Therefore, least square can be used to recover a more accurate candidate secret key polynomial with equations in the screened interval. By iterating the process several times, the secret key polynomial can be successfully recovered. The e ciency of the proposed technique is veri ed with power traces measured from the Dilithium reference implementation running on a Cortex-M4 processor. The evaluation results show that only several hundreds of power traces are enough to recover the secret key used by Dilithium.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. SecureComm 2026
Keywords
Post-Quantum CryptographyDilithiumSide-Channel ResistanceSecret Key RecoveryResidual Interval Screening
Contact author(s)
shikailong @ iie ac cn
zhanghailong @ ncepu edu cn
ddl @ iie ac cn
zichen_wang @ gwmail gwu edu
History
2026-06-08: approved
2026-06-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1151
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1151,
      author = {Kailong Shi and Hailong Zhang and Dongdai Lin and Zichen Wang},
      title = {Fine-Grained Residual Interval Screening Enhanced Least Square for the Secret Key Recovery of Dilithium},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1151},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1151}
}
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