Paper 2026/1080
Pushing the Limit of Memory-efficient Collision Attack Framework for SHA-2
Abstract
The SHA-2 family hash is standardized by NIST and mainly includes two variants, SHA-256 and SHA-512. Due to its widespread deployment, its security has attracted continuous attention from various parties. Although Li et al. have developed open-source SAT/SMT-based tools and proposed new memory-efficient collision attack frameworks for SHA-2 in recent two years, practical collision attacks are only achieved for 31-step SHA-256 and 29-step SHA-512, respectively. To push the limit of such an attack framework for SHA-2, we carefully investigate existing strategies to choose message differences used in 38/39-step semi-free-start collision attacks. We found that by selecting message words $(W_{4+i}, \ldots, W_{8+i}, W_{12+i}, W_{13+i}, W_{20+i}, W_{22+i})_{0\leq i \leq 3}$ to inject differences, and employing the open-source SAT/SMT-based automated tools to search for the corresponding differential characteristics, notable improvement can be achieved for practical and theoretical collision attacks. Specifically, the first practical collision attacks on 35-step SHA-256 and SHA-512 can be achieved for $i=0$, improving the best practical collision attacks on SHA-256 and SHA-512 by 4 and 6 steps, respectively. When $i\in\{1,2\}$, theoretical collision attacks on both SHA-256 and SHA-512 can reach up to 36/37 steps. We have also tried collision attack up to 38 steps by setting $i=3$, but the uncontrolled differential probability is too low to be used for effective attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2026
- Keywords
- Hash functionsSHA-2Collision attackMessage difference
- Contact author(s)
-
liyx1140 @ 163 com
liufukangs @ gmail com - History
- 2026-05-31: approved
- 2026-05-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1080
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1080,
author = {Yingxin Li and Fukang Liu and Gaoli Wang and Jiali Shi},
title = {Pushing the Limit of Memory-efficient Collision Attack Framework for {SHA}-2},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1080},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1080}
}