Paper 2026/1050

Guess-and-Determine Rebound Revisited: Full Quantum Collision Attack on AES-256 in DM Hash Mode

Liyuan Tang, Tsinghua University
Lingyue Qin, Tsinghua University
Shiqi Hou, Tsinghua University
Xiaoyang Dong, Tsinghua University
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2025, Qin et al. introduced the guess-and-determine (GD) rebound attack, which integrates the guess-and-determine approach by Bouillaguet, Derbez, and Fouque and the rebound attack by Mendel et al. Taking the GD rebound as a building block, this paper introduces several classical and quantum models to convert the semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack or free-start (FS) collision attack into collision attacks on DM hashing mode with AES. As an application, the first full quantum collision attack on AES-256-DM is proposed. Despite numerous round-reduced quantum or classical attacks proposed against the three popular hash modes MMO/MP/DM with AES over the past two decades, this is the first full attack that targets one of the three fundamental security requirements: collision, (2nd) preimage resistance. Our full attack on AES-256-DM improves the best previous attack by Taiyama et al. at ASIACRYPT 2024 by 5 rounds. Besides, some improved results on AES-128-DM and AES-192-DM are also given, which have been verified partially or fully by experiments.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2026
Keywords
Rebound AttackGuess-and-DetermineAES-256Quantum Attack
Contact author(s)
tangly22 @ mails tsinghua edu cn
qinly @ tsinghua edu cn
seventeenhsq @ gmail com
xiaoyangdong @ tsinghua edu cn
History
2026-05-28: last of 3 revisions
2026-05-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1050
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1050,
      author = {Liyuan Tang and Lingyue Qin and Shiqi Hou and Xiaoyang Dong},
      title = {Guess-and-Determine Rebound Revisited: Full Quantum Collision Attack on {AES}-256 in {DM} Hash Mode},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1050},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1050}
}
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