Paper 2025/965

An Efficient Framework for Collusion Resistant Multiparty FHE

Robin Jadoul, 3MI Labs
Barry van Leeuwen, KU Leuven
Oliver Zajonc, KU Leuven
Abstract

Multiparty fully homomorphic encryption (MPFHE) is a generalization of (multi-key) fully homomorphic encryption ((MK)FHE) that lives on the cusp between multiparty computation (MPC) and FHE, enabling a computation over encrypted data using multiple keys. However, contrary to MKFHE, it seeks to reduce the noise inflation based on the number of parties by allowing the parties to first compute shared data in MPC before executing the computation in FHE. However, many works use specific constructions reliant on the behaviour of a particular scheme and do not consider security against colluding servers and parties. In this work, we present a new framework that is secure against collusion between servers and parties and allows the use of a broad spectrum of MPC and FHE protocols, while eliminating the noise inflation based on the participating number of parties. We then show a case study of this using the FINAL scheme and show that we reduce the required key material by 40-99.9% compared to the MKFHE FINAL scheme, FINALLY, 8-71% compared to the static AKÖ scheme, and 65-70% compared to the Park-Rovira scheme. Moreover, we reduce the bootstrapping time for the AKÖ, Park-Rovira, and KMS schemes by 75-99.7%.

Note: Major revision

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Multiparty ComputationFully Homomorphic EncryptionMultiparty FHELWENTRUKey Switching
Contact author(s)
robin jadoul @ 3milabs tech
barry vanleeuwen @ kuleuven be
oliver zajonc @ kuleuven be
History
2026-05-05: last of 2 revisions
2025-05-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/965
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/965,
      author = {Robin Jadoul and Barry van Leeuwen and Oliver Zajonc},
      title = {An Efficient Framework for Collusion Resistant Multiparty {FHE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/965},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/965}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.