Paper 2025/950
Breaking Poseidon Challenges with Graeffe Transforms and Complexity Analysis by FFT Lower Bounds
Abstract
Poseidon and Poseidon2 are cryptographic hash functions designed for efficient zero-knowledge proof protocols and have been widely adopted in Ethereum applications. To encourage security research, the Ethereum Foundation announced a bounty program in November 2024 for breaking the Poseidon challenges, i.e. solving the CICO (Constrained Input, Constrained Output) problems for round-reduced Poseidon constructions. In this paper, we explain how to apply the Graeffe transform to univariate polynomial solving, enabling efficient interpolation attacks against Poseidon. We will provide an open-source code and details our approach for solving several challenges valued at $20000 in total. Compared to existing attacks, we improves 2^{13} and 2^{4.5} times in wall time and memory usage, respectively. For all challenges we solved, the cost of memory access turns out to be an essential barrier, which makes the security margin much larger than expected. We actually prove that the memory access cost for FFT grows as the 4/3-power of the input size, up to a logarithmic factor. This indicates the commonly used pseudo linear estimate may be overly conservative. This is very different from multivariate equation solving whose main bottleneck is linear algebra over finite fields. Thus, it might be preferable to choose parameters such that the best known attack is interpolation, as it presents more inherent hardness.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
-
ziyuzhao0008 @ outlook com
jintai ding @ gmail com - History
- 2025-05-26: approved
- 2025-05-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/950
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/950, author = {Ziyu Zhao and Jintai Ding}, title = {Breaking Poseidon Challenges with Graeffe Transforms and Complexity Analysis by {FFT} Lower Bounds}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/950}, year = {2025}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/950} }