Paper 2025/851

V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy

James Bell-Clark, Google
Adrià Gascón, Google
Baiyu Li, Google
Mariana Raykova, Google
Amrita Roy Chowdhury, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
Abstract

Local differential privacy (LDP) enables individuals to report sensitive data while preserving privacy. Unfortunately, LDP mechanisms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries controlling a fraction of the reporting users can significantly distort the aggregate output--much more so than in a non-private solution where the inputs are reported directly. In this paper, we present two novel solutions that prevent poisoning attacks under LDP while preserving its privacy guarantees. Our first solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity-}{\textit{Auth}}$, addresses scenarios where the users report inputs with a ground truth available to a third party. The second solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity}$, tackles the more challenging case in which the users locally generate their input and there is no ground truth which can be used to bootstrap verifiable randomness generation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Local differential privacyverifiable randomness generation
Contact author(s)
jhbell @ google com
adriag @ google com
baiyuli @ google com
marianar @ google com
aroyc @ umich edu
History
2025-05-17: approved
2025-05-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/851
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/851,
      author = {James Bell-Clark and Adrià Gascón and Baiyu Li and Mariana Raykova and Amrita Roy Chowdhury},
      title = {V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/851},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/851}
}
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