Paper 2025/851
V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy
Abstract
Local differential privacy (LDP) enables individuals to report sensitive data while preserving privacy. Unfortunately, LDP mechanisms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries controlling a fraction of the reporting users can significantly distort the aggregate output--much more so than in a non-private solution where the inputs are reported directly. In this paper, we present two novel solutions that prevent poisoning attacks under LDP while preserving its privacy guarantees. Our first solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity-}{\textit{Auth}}$, addresses scenarios where the users report inputs with a ground truth available to a third party. The second solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity}$, tackles the more challenging case in which the users locally generate their input and there is no ground truth which can be used to bootstrap verifiable randomness generation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Local differential privacyverifiable randomness generation
- Contact author(s)
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jhbell @ google com
adriag @ google com
baiyuli @ google com
marianar @ google com
aroyc @ umich edu - History
- 2025-05-17: approved
- 2025-05-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/851
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/851, author = {James Bell-Clark and Adrià Gascón and Baiyu Li and Mariana Raykova and Amrita Roy Chowdhury}, title = {V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/851}, year = {2025}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/851} }