Paper 2025/850

Succinct Computational Secret Sharing for Monotone Circuits

George Lu, The University of Texas at Austin
Shafik Nassar, The University of Texas at Austin
Brent Waters, The University of Texas at Austin, NTT Research
Abstract

Secret sharing is a cornerstone of modern cryptography, underpinning the secure distribution and reconstruction of secrets among authorized participants. In these schemes, succinctness—measured by the size of the distributed shares—has long been an area of both great theoretical and practical interest, with large gaps between constructions and best known lower bounds. In this paper, we present a novel computational secret sharing scheme for monotone Boolean circuits that achieves substantially shorter share sizes than previously known constructions in the standard model. Our scheme attains a public share size of $n + \mathsf{poly}(\lambda, \log |C|)$ and a user share size of $\lambda$, where n denotes the number of users, $C$ is the monotone circuit and $\lambda$ is the security parameter, thus effectively eliminating the dependence on the circuit size. This marks a significant improvement over earlier approaches, which exhibited share sizes that grew with the number of gates in the circuit. Our construction makes use of indistinguishability obfuscation and injective one-way functions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Secret Sharing
Contact author(s)
gclu @ cs utexas edu
shafik @ cs utexas edu
bwaters @ cs utexas edu
History
2025-05-17: approved
2025-05-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/850
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/850,
      author = {George Lu and Shafik Nassar and Brent Waters},
      title = {Succinct Computational Secret Sharing for Monotone Circuits},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/850},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/850}
}
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