Paper 2025/776

Clementine: A Collateral-Efficient, Trust-Minimized, and Scalable Bitcoin Bridge

Ekrem Bal, Citrea
Lukas Aumayr, Common Prefix, University of Edinburgh
Atacan İyidoğan, Citrea
Giulia Scaffino, Common Prefix, TU Wien
Hakan Karakuş, Citrea
Cengiz Eray Aslan, Citrea
Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Common Prefix, Imperial College London
Abstract

This whitepaper introduces Clementine, a secure, collateral-efficient, trust-minimized, and scalable Bitcoin bridge based on BitVM2 that enables withdrawals from rollups or other side systems to Bitcoin. Clementine proposes a new Bitcoin light client that remains secure against adversaries controlling less than 50% of Bitcoin’s hash rate, assuming at least one honest Watchtower in a permissioned set. The protocol is collateral-efficient, reusing locked funds over time and reducing unnecessary dust outputs through the strategic use of 0-value outputs, and scalable, enabling a single challenge per Operator to slash multiple misbehaviors. This increases throughput and reduces on-chain load without compromising security. Clementine enables trust-minimized and efficient peg-outs from Citrea to Bitcoin, making zk-rollups on Bitcoin practical and unlocking new paths for native scalability and interoperability.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
BitcoinBitVMLight ClientBridgeRollupBlockchain
Contact author(s)
ekrem @ chainway xyz
lukas @ commonprefix com
atacan @ chainway xyz
giulia @ commonprefix com
hakan @ chainway xyz
eray @ chainway xyz
orfeas litos @ hotmail com
History
2025-05-02: revised
2025-04-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/776
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/776,
      author = {Ekrem Bal and Lukas Aumayr and Atacan İyidoğan and Giulia Scaffino and Hakan Karakuş and Cengiz Eray Aslan and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos},
      title = {Clementine: A Collateral-Efficient, Trust-Minimized, and Scalable Bitcoin Bridge},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/776},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/776}
}
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