Paper 2025/762

: nagement of Low-tency outing mpact on Mix Network nonymity (Extended Version)

Mahdi Rahimi, COSIC (KU Leuven)
Abstract

Mix networks (mixnets) offer robust anonymity even against adversaries monitoring all network links; however, they impose high latency on communications. To address this, recent research has explored strategic low-latency routing within mixnets. While these strategies appear to reduce latency, their impact on mixnet anonymity has not been carefully assessed, raising concerns about potential deanonymization of clients. Tackling this challenge, this paper first quantifies the anonymity loss associated with low-latency routing techniques in mixnets. Building on these insights, second, we introduce a novel low-latency routing method that maintains mixnet anonymity while achieving significant latency reductions compared to the state-of-the-art solution LARMix (NDSS, 2024). Our approach also ensures a more balanced load distribution among mixnet nodes. Moreover, under adversarial conditions where parts of the mixnet are compromised, our method does not confer significant advantages to the adversary, unlike LARMix. Thus, our proposal emerges as the optimal choice for low-latency routing in mixnets. Furthermore, we note that this version expands on both the analytical and experimental results of the previously published paper in NCA 2024, specifically through investigating the anonymity of Loopix-like mixnets.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA 2024)
Keywords
Network SecurityAnonymityMix Networks
Contact author(s)
mahdi rahimi @ esat kuleuven be
History
2025-04-30: approved
2025-04-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/762
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/762,
      author = {Mahdi Rahimi},
      title = {$\textbf{{MALARIA}}$: $\textbf{Ma}$nagement of Low-$\textbf{La}$tency $\textbf{R}$outing $\textbf{I}$mpact on Mix Network $\textbf{A}$nonymity (Extended Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/762},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/762}
}
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