Attacking soundness for an optimization of the Gemini Polynomial Commitment Scheme

Lydia Garms; Michael Livesey

Paper 2025/565

Attacking soundness for an optimization of the Gemini Polynomial Commitment Scheme

Lydia Garms, Ernst and Young, UK

Michael Livesey

, Ernst & Young, UK

Abstract

We demonstrate an attack on the soundness of a widely known optimization of the Gemini multilinear Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS). The attack allows a malicious prover to falsely claim that a multilinear polynomial takes a value of their choice, for any input point. We stress that the original Gemini multilinear PCS and HyperKZG, an adaptation of Gemini, are not affected by the attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Polynomial Commitment Scheme Multilinear ZK-SNARKS
Contact author(s): LYDIA GARMS @ uk ey com
michael livesey @ uk ey com
History: 2025-03-28: approved; 2025-03-27: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/565
License: CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/565,
      author = {Lydia Garms and Michael Livesey},
      title = {Attacking soundness for an optimization of the Gemini Polynomial Commitment Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/565},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/565}
}