Paper 2025/409
Low Communication Threshold FHE from Standard (Module-)LWE
Abstract
Threshold fully homomorphic encryption (ThFHE) is a multi-party extension of FHE; any subset of at least $T$ out of $N$ parties can decrypt the ciphertexts by combining their decryption shares. Recently, Passelègue and Stehlé (Asiacrypt 2024) presented a ThFHE scheme with polynomially short decryption shares from the ``known-norm'' variant of learning with errors (LWE) assumption, in which the norm of the secret key is leaked to the adversary. While known-norm LWE is reduced from standard LWE, its module extension, known-covariance module-LWE (MLWE), lacks a known reduction from standard MLWE. Hence, extending their ThFHE scheme to the MLWE-based construction remains an open question. In this paper, we address this open problem: We construct a ThFHE scheme with polynomially small decryption shares from standard LWE/MLWE. Our core technique, which we call noise padding, eliminates the need of known-norm variants of LWE. We distribute shares of a padding noise and use them to adjust the distribution of decryption noise so that no information about the secret key is leaked. Furthermore, our ThFHE efficiently realizes arbitrary $T$-out-of-$N$ threshold decryption via simple Shamir secret sharing instead of $\{0,1\}$-linear secret sharing. Hence, the sizes of the keys, ciphertexts and decryption shares in our scheme are compact: they are $O(1)$ w.r.t. the number of parties $N$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2025
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-981-95-5122-4_6
- Keywords
- ThresholdFHELatticeLWE
- Contact author(s)
- ir-okada @ kddi com
- History
- 2026-03-26: last of 4 revisions
- 2025-03-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/409
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/409,
author = {Hiroki Okada and Tsuyoshi Takagi},
title = {Low Communication Threshold {FHE} from Standard (Module-){LWE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/409},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1007/978-981-95-5122-4_6},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/409}
}