Paper 2025/260

Quantum Security Evaluation of ASCON

Yujin Oh, Hansung University
Kyungbae Jang, Hansung University
Hwajeong Seo, Hansung University
Abstract

Grover's algorithm, which reduces the search complexity of symmetric-key ciphers and hash functions, poses a significant security challenge in cryptography. Recent research has focused on estimating Grover's search complexity and assessing post-quantum security. This paper analyzes a quantum circuit implementation of ASCON, including ASCON-AEAD, hash functions, and ASCON-80pq, in alignment with NIST’s lightweight cryptography standardization efforts. We place particular emphasis on circuit depth, which directly impacts execution time, and analyze the quantum resource costs associated with Grover’s algorithm-based key recovery and collision attacks. Additionally, we estimate the resources required to assess the quantum-resistant security strength of ASCON, based on security levels and the latest research trends.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-quantum Security LevelASCONGrover's AlgorithmQuantum Collision Attack
Contact author(s)
oyj0922 @ gmail com
starj1023 @ gmail com
hwajeong84 @ gmail com
History
2025-02-18: approved
2025-02-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/260
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/260,
      author = {Yujin Oh and Kyungbae Jang and Hwajeong Seo},
      title = {Quantum Security Evaluation of {ASCON}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/260},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/260}
}
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