Paper 2025/246

Towards Optimal Early Stopping Agreement Protocols

Fatima Elsheimy, Yale University
Julian Loss, Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Charalampos Papamanthou, Yale University
Abstract

Early stopping agreement protocols guarantee termination based on the actual number of malicious parties, ft, encountered during execution, rather than assuming the worst-case scenario of t<n many corruptions. The lower bound on the round complexity for such protocols is known to be min{f+2,t+1} many rounds. In this work, we substantially improve the state of the art for cryptographic early stopping protocols in the honest majority setting where t<n/2. In this scenario, the best known protocol due to Elsheimy, Loss, and Papamanthou (ASIACRYPT `24) achieves a round complexity of for some constant . We begin by introducing an improvement to the Elsheimy et al. approach which can be used to obtain the first polynomial-time early stopping agreement protocols in the corruption regime which achieve a complexity of . We then instantiate our generic framework with refined components to obtain a very concretely efficient protocol with a round complexity of only and polynomial communication complexity. Finally, we show that it is possible to come within one round of the optimal round complexity by presenting a broadcast protocol based on the exponential information gathering approach, which achieves a round complexity of , albeit with exponential communication complexity.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Byzantine AgreementRound ComplexityEarly Stopping
Contact author(s)
Fatima elsheimy @ yale edu
lossjulian @ gmail com
charalampos papamanthou @ yale edu
History
2025-02-17: approved
2025-02-16: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/246
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/246,
      author = {Fatima Elsheimy and Julian Loss and Charalampos Papamanthou},
      title = {Towards Optimal Early Stopping Agreement Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/246},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/246}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.