Paper 2025/229

ETK: External-Operations TreeKEM and the Security of MLS in RFC 9420

Cas Cremers, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Esra Günsay, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Vera Wesselkamp, Hasso Plattner Institute
Mang Zhao, Wuhan University
Abstract

The Messaging Layer Security protocol MLS is standardized in IETF's RFC 9420 and allows a group of parties to securely establish and evolve group keys even if the servers are malicious. The core design of MLS is based on the TreeKEM protocol, which was significantly modified and extended during the standard's development. Over the last years, several partial security analyses have appeared of incomplete drafts of the standard. One of the major additions to MLS RFC 9420 (the final version of the standard) are the external operations, i.e., external commits and proposals. These additional operations have not been considered in any previous security analysis, while they can have a significant impact on the standard's security. In this work, we prove the consistency, confidentiality and authentication of MLS in RFC 9420. To this end, we formalize $\mathsf{ETK}$: External-Operations TreeKEM, which models RFC 9420 and includes the external commits and proposals. We propose a corresponding ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{ECGKA}}$ and prove that $\mathsf{ETK}$ realizes it. Our work is the first cryptographic analysis that considers both the final changes to the standard, and the first approach overall to cover external proposals and external commits. Compared to previous works that considered MLS drafts, our $\mathsf{ETK}$ protocol is by far the closest to the final MLS RFC 9420 standard. Our analysis implies that the core of MLS in RFC 9420 is an $\mathsf{ETK}$ protocol that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{ECGKA}}$. Notably, we show that when external proposals and commits are allowed, MLS achieves a weaker form of security than was suggested by previous analyses, because the external operations can be exploited to violate Post-Compromise Security guarantees. We show that the security of the protocol can be further strengthened by leveraging the standard's optional PSK mechanism, allowing another form of healing, and give a corresponding construction $\mathsf{ETK}^{\mathrm{PSK}}$ and ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{ECGKA}^{\mathrm{PSK}}}$.

Note: Version 2.0, April 11, 2026: - Added Changelog. - Extended security results in Section 5.2. - Substantial additions including simpli ed versions of ETK, ETKPSK, and helper functions. - Updated the parent-hash computation from the Draft 12 formulation to the version adopted in MLS since Draft 13. - Updated technical details and improved consistency regarding the corruption of isk and ssk in Figures 13 and 15.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2026
Keywords
Message Layer SecurityMLSSecure MessagingGroup Messaging
Contact author(s)
cremers @ cispa de
esra guensay @ cispa de
vera wesselkamp @ t-online de
mang zhao @ hotmail com
History
2026-04-11: last of 2 revisions
2025-02-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/229
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/229,
      author = {Cas Cremers and Esra Günsay and Vera Wesselkamp and Mang Zhao},
      title = {{ETK}: External-Operations {TreeKEM} and the Security of {MLS} in {RFC} 9420},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/229},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/229}
}
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