Paper 2025/2264

Leakage-Resilient Multi-Party Computation: Protecting the Evaluator in Circuits Garbling

Francesco Berti, Bar-Ilan University
Itamar Levi, Bar-Ilan University
Abstract

Garbling schemes allow two parties to compute a joint function on private inputs without revealing them. Yet, a semi-honest garbler might exploit hardware/software sidechannel leakages from the evaluator. An alarming threat with no concrete solution yet. Using the homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption, we can prevent such leakage-based attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
cryptographyMPCgarblingleakage
Contact author(s)
francesco berti @ biu ac il
itamar levi @ biu ac il
History
2025-12-18: approved
2025-12-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/2264
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2264,
      author = {Francesco Berti and Itamar Levi},
      title = {Leakage-Resilient Multi-Party Computation: Protecting the Evaluator in Circuits Garbling},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2264},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2264}
}
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