Paper 2025/2097

Hash-Based Blind Signatures: First Steps

Javier Herranz, Dept. Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Hugo Louiso, Université de Bordeaux
Abstract

Hash-based signatures are a strong candidate for post-quantum scenarios requiring authentication and integrity. Their security relies only on (well-studied) properties of hash functions, so they may be thought as being more robust than other schemes that (today) resist quantum attacks, like those based on lattices, coding or isogenies. Recent works also study hash-based signature schemes with additional properties, such as group, ring, threshold, or aggregate signature schemes. In this work, we do the same for the important case of blind signatures. We describe a secure (in the programmable random oracle model) modification of Fischlin's generic construction of blind signatures that can be instantiated with different hash-based protocols. As a result, we obtain the first blind signature schemes whose security relies only on the collision resistance of hash functions. Finally, as a proof of concept, we have implemented one (highly non-optimized) of the possible instantiations.

Note: Added references to recent/concurrent very related work, improved presentation and formalism

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
hash-based signaturesblind signaturespost-quantum security
Contact author(s)
javier herranz @ upc edu
hugolouiso @ gmail com
History
2026-04-04: last of 3 revisions
2025-11-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/2097
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2097,
      author = {Javier Herranz and Hugo Louiso},
      title = {Hash-Based Blind Signatures: First Steps},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2097},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2097}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.