Paper 2025/2076

Non-Interactive Blind Signatures from RSA Assumption and More

Lucjan Hanzlik, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Eugenio Paracucchi, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Riccardo Zanotto, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Abstract

Blind signatures have received increased attention from researchers and practitioners. They allow users to obtain a signature under a message without revealing it to the signer. One of the most popular applications of blind signatures is to use them as one-time tokens, where the issuing is not linkable to the redeeming phase, and the signature under a random identifier forms a valid token. This concept is the backbone of the Privacy Pass system, which uses it to identify honest but anonymous users and protect content delivery networks from botnets. Non-interactive blind signatures for random messages were introduced by Hanzlik (Eurocrypt'23). They allow a signer to create a pre-signature with respect to a particular public key, while the corresponding secret key can later be used to finalize the signature. This non-interaction allows for more applications than in the case of blind signatures. In particular, the author suggested using regular PKI keys as the recipient public key, allowing for a distribution of one-time tokens to users outside the system, e.g., to public keys of GitHub users, similar to airdropping of cryptocurrencies. Unfortunately, despite introducing this concept, the paper fails to provide schemes that work with keys used in the wild. We solve this open problem. We introduce a generic construction of non-interactive blind signatures that relies on Yao's garbled circuit techniques and provide particular improvements to this generic setting. We replace oblivious transfer with their non-interactive variant and show how to construct them so that the recipient's public key, encoding the $\mathsf{OT}$ choice, is a standard RSA public key $(e,N)$. To improve the efficiency of the garbling, we show how to garble the signing algorithm of the pairing-based Pointcheval-Sanders (PS) signatures and the RSA-based signature scheme with efficient protocols by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. Our technique also apply to the well-known BBS signatures. All our improvements are of independent interest and are central to our contribution.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2025
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91124-8
Keywords
Non-Interactive Blind SignaturesRSAQuadratic ResiduosityPairing-based cryptographyPrivacy
Contact author(s)
lucjan hanzlik @ cispa de
eugenio paracucchi @ cispa de
riccardo zanotto @ cispa de
History
2025-11-13: approved
2025-11-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/2076
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2076,
      author = {Lucjan Hanzlik and Eugenio Paracucchi and Riccardo Zanotto},
      title = {Non-Interactive Blind Signatures from {RSA} Assumption and More},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2076},
      year = {2025},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91124-8},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2076}
}
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