Paper 2025/1997
Provable decryption failure security for practical lattice-based PKE
, Technical University of Denmark, Technical University of DenmarkAbstract
Recently, Hövelmanns, Hülsing, and Majenz introduced a security notion called Find Failing Plaintext – Non Generic (FFP-NG), which captures the ability of an adversary to find decryption failures by making non-trivial use of the public key. A first analysis of this property for lattice-based schemes was presented by Majenz and Sisinni, who showed that the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem reduces to breaking the FFP-NG security of the PVW scheme with discrete Gaussian noise. In this work, we generalize their result by analysing the FFP-NG security of widely used schemes based on Ring-LWE and Module-LWE. To keep our analysis as general as possible, we consider a family of subgaussian distributions that includes, among others, discrete Gaussians and centered binomials.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- LWEML-KEMFFP-NGsubgaussian
- Contact author(s)
-
chmaj @ dtu dk
fasi @ dtu dk - History
- 2025-10-30: approved
- 2025-10-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1997
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1997,
author = {Christian Majenz and Fabrizio Sisinni},
title = {Provable decryption failure security for practical lattice-based {PKE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1997},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1997}
}
