Feedback Lunch: Deep Feedback Codes for Wiretap Channels

Yingyao Zhou; Natasha Devroye; Onur Günlü

Paper 2025/1948

Feedback Lunch: Deep Feedback Codes for Wiretap Channels

Yingyao Zhou

, University of Illinois at Chicago

Natasha Devroye

, University of Illinois at Chicago

Onur Günlü

, TU Dortmund University, Linköping University

Abstract

We consider reversely-degraded wiretap channels, for which the secrecy capacity is zero if there is no channel feedback. This work focuses on a seeded modular code design for the Gaussian wiretap channel with channel output feedback, combining universal hash functions for security and learned feedback-based codes for reliability to achieve positive secrecy rates. We study the trade-off between communication reliability and information leakage, illustrating that feedback enables agreeing on a secret key shared between legitimate parties, overcoming the security advantage of the wiretapper. Our findings also motivate code designs for sensing-assisted secure communication, to be used in next-generation integrated sensing and communication methods.

Note: preprint version submitted to IEEE Communications Letters

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: wiretap channel information-theoretic security feedback coding secrecy capacity
Contact author(s): yzhou238 @ uic edu
devroye @ uic edu
onur guenlue @ tu-dortmund de
History: 2025-10-20: approved; 2025-10-18: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2025/1948
License: CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1948,
      author = {Yingyao Zhou and Natasha Devroye and Onur Günlü},
      title = {Feedback Lunch: Deep Feedback Codes for Wiretap Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1948},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1948}
}