Paper 2025/1911

Differential Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Feistel Ciphers

Bastien Michel, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
Dounia M'foukh, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
María Naya-Plasencia, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation
Abstract

Differential meet-in-the-middle attacks, introduced by Boura et al. in 2023, propose a new way of dealing with differential distinguishers. It allows, in particular, to combine differential attacks with initial structures, that were usually used exclusively for meet-in-the-middle attacks. Several applications of this new technique have been published, but so far the results on Feistel constructions have not improved much upon previous best known attacks. In this paper, we apply them on Feistel constructions with all the improvements proposed so far, and we propose some additional new ideas to generically improve these kinds of attacks. We also propose an automatized tool for optimizing the attacks on Simon-like constructions. Our tool outputs a graphical representation of the attack that makes it very easy to verify. All this has allowed us to provide improved single-key key-recovery attacks on most of the variants of Simon, Simeck and CLEFIA-256, that increase the highest number of rounds attacked by 1 or 2 in nearly all the cases.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
symmetric cryptanalysisdifferential Meet-in-the-MiddleFeistelautomatic cryptanalysisSimonSimeckCLEFIA
Contact author(s)
bastien michel @ inria fr
dounia mfoukh @ inria fr
maria naya_plasencia @ inria fr
History
2025-10-17: approved
2025-10-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1911
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1911,
      author = {Bastien Michel and Dounia M'foukh and María Naya-Plasencia},
      title = {Differential Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Feistel Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1911},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1911}
}
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