Paper 2025/1868

Is the Hard-Label Cryptanalytic Model Extraction Really Polynomial?

Akira Ito, Tohoku University
Takayuki Miura, NTT Social Informatics Laboratories
Yosuke Todo, NTT Social Informatics Laboratories
Abstract

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have attracted significant attention, and their internal models are now considered valuable intellectual assets. Extracting such a model via oracle access to a DNN is conceptually similar to extracting a secret key via oracle access to a block cipher. Consequently, cryptanalytic techniques, particularly differential-like attacks, have been actively explored recently. ReLU-based DNNs are the most common and widely deployed architectures. While early works (e.g., Crypto 2020, Eurocrypt 2024) assume access to exact output logits, which are typically not exposed, more recent works (e.g., Asiacrypt 2024, Eurocrypt 2025) focus on the hard-label setting, where only the final classification result (e.g., "dog" or "car") is available to the attacker. Notably, Carlini et al. (Eurocrypt 2025) demonstrated that model extraction is feasible in polynomial time even under this restricted setting. In this paper, we show that a key assumption underlying their attack becomes increasingly unrealistic as the target depth grows. While prior works have noted neurons whose activation states rarely change, we analyze their concrete impact on hard-label extraction: even a single neuron that is (almost) always active can prevent the attack from proceeding unless its parameters are recovered, and ignoring it inevitably incurs a non-negligible error. A straightforward solution is to extract these parameters by observing a state switch of such a neuron, but observing such a switch becomes exponentially harder as the depth increases, implying that hard-label extraction is not always polynomial time. To address this limitation, we propose a novel attack method called cross-layer extraction. Rather than extracting the secret parameters (e.g., weights and biases) directly, we exploit cross-layer interactions to recover them from deeper layers, reducing query complexity and addressing limitations of existing model extraction approaches.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
ReLU-Based Neural NetworksNeural Network ExtractionPolynomial Time Attack
Contact author(s)
akira ito b1 @ tohoku ac jp
tkyk miura @ ntt com
yosuke todo @ ntt com
History
2026-03-26: revised
2025-10-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1868
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1868,
      author = {Akira Ito and Takayuki Miura and Yosuke Todo},
      title = {Is the Hard-Label Cryptanalytic Model Extraction Really Polynomial?},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1868},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1868}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.