Paper 2025/1854
Credential Revocation Assisted by a Covertly Corrupted Server
, Cybernetica (Estonia), Cybernetica (Estonia), Tallinn University of TechnologyAbstract
European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet aims to provide end users with a way to get attested credentials from issuers, and present them to different relying parties. An important property mentioned in the regulatory frameworks is the possibility to revoke a previously issued credential. While it is possible to issue a short-lived credential, in some cases it may be inconvenient, and a separate revocation service which allows to revoke a credential at any time may be necessary. In this work, we propose a full end-to-end description of a generic credential revocation system, which technically relies on a single server and secure transmission channels between parties. We prove security of the proposed revocation functionality in the universal composability model, and estimate its efficiency based on a proof-of-concept implementation.
Note: Revision details: Extended the proof to dynamic corruption of users, issuers, and verifiers (the server and the judge are statically corrupted); defined explicit leakages in the case of dynamic corruption. Added a quantitative estimate for the security analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- attribute-based credentialsrevocationuniversal composabilityaccountabilitycovert adversary
- Contact author(s)
-
alisa pankova @ cyber ee
jelizaveta vakarjuk @ cyber ee - History
- 2026-06-09: last of 2 revisions
- 2025-10-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1854
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1854,
author = {Alisa Pankova and Jelizaveta Vakarjuk},
title = {Credential Revocation Assisted by a Covertly Corrupted Server},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1854},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1854}
}
